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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Many areas of the United States are facing a housing affordability 
crisis, and the problem only seems to be getting worse. A family with 
average earnings cannot afford the median priced home in any of the 
thirty least affordable housing markets,1 and prices in the most 
expensive markets continue to rise. Between 1995 and 2002, median 
home prices rose by 65% in the San Francisco Bay Area, 62% in 
Boston, 54% in San Diego, and 49% in Denver.2 The areas with the 
worst affordability problems are typically clustered on the East and 
                                                                                                                      
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Economics, San Jose State University, and Director of the 
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 ∗∗ Assistant Professor of Economics, San Jose State University. Ph.D., Economics, 
George Mason University, 2002. The authors have benefited from discussions with Paul 
Campos, Jack Estill, Roger Folsom, Tom Means, Mike Pogodzinski, Phil Rafton, Todd 
Zywicki, and participants of inclusionary zoning panels where we have presented, 
including the California Department of Housing and Community Development, 
Sacramento, California (Nov. 3, 2004); the California Housing Consortium Public Policy 
Forum, Long Beach, California (Sept. 28, 2004); the Annual Ventura County Housing 
Conference, Simi Valley, California (Sept. 15, 2004); the Plan for the People, Monterey, 
California (June 25, 2004); the Pacific Coast Builders Conference, San Francisco, 
California (June 17, 2004); the Building Industry of Southern California Annual Meetings, 
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 1. Ruth Simon, The Nation’s Least-Affordable Housing Markets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
12, 2005, at D2. 
 2. John M. Quigley & Steven Raphael, Is Housing Unaffordable? Why Isn’t It More 
Affordable?, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2004, at 191, 191.  
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West Coasts,3 with twenty of the twenty-five least affordable 
metropolitan areas in California.4 Needless to say, such high housing 
costs preclude many families from being able to afford their own 
home.5  
 To deal with high housing costs, many local governments are in-
vestigating and implementing a price-control program called inclu-
sionary zoning.6 Nearly every economist agrees that rent control re-
duces the quantity and quality of housing,7 and places such as Mas-
sachusetts and California have statewide mandates that prohibit 
new rent control ordinances,8 so planners have devised a more com-
plicated alternative to rent control. Inclusionary zoning, also known 
as an affordable housing mandate, places a price control on a per-
centage of new development, requiring builders to sell or rent those 
homes which are deemed affordable to very low-, low-, or moderate-
income households. The units must retain price controls for a speci-
fied period of time; in California the amount is typically fifty-five 
years or more.9  
 Although the program is legally and economically distinct from 
rent control,10 law-and-economics scholars who have analyzed the 
issue have argued that price controls on a percentage of new housing 
will have many of the same negative effects as rent control.11 In one 
                                                                                                                      
 3. Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, Zoning’s Steep Price, REG., Fall 2003, at 24. 
 4. Simon, supra note 1. 
 5. See, e.g., ERIN RICHES, CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, LOCKED OUT 2004: CALIFORNIA’S 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS 1 (2004), http://www.cbp.org/2004/lockedout2004.pdf. 
 6. See, e.g., CAL. COAL. FOR RURAL HOUS. & NON-PROFIT HOUS. ASS’N OF N. CAL., 
INCLUSIONARY HOUSING IN CALIFORNIA: 30 YEARS OF INNOVATION (2003), http:// 
www.calruralhousing.org/Publications/Inclusionary30Years.pdf [hereinafter INCLUSIONARY 
HOUSING] (documenting many of the California inclusionary ordinances). Information on 
other areas of the country that have adopted inclusionary ordinances past and present can 
be found in Nico Calavita et al., Inclusionary Housing in California and New Jersey: A 
Comparative Analysis, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 109 (1997). See also ALLAN MALLACH, 
INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1984); Robert Burchell & 
Catherine Galley, Inclusionary Zoning: Pros and Cons, NEW CENTURY HOUSING, Oct. 2000, 
at 3, 5. 
 7. Of 211 American economists responding to a poll, ninety-eight percent agreed that 
“[a] ceiling on rents reduces the quantity and quality of housing available.” J.R. Kearl et 
al., A Confusion of Economists?, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 28, 30 (1979).  
 8. Massachusetts passed a statewide ban on rent control in 1994 through a ballot 
initiative with fifty-one percent of the vote. See Matthew Brelis, As Promised, Weld Vetoes 
Cambridge Rent Control Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 1994, at 17, available at 1994 
WLNR 2038078. California passed the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act in 1995, 
limiting new rent control and gradually decontrolling existing rental units. Nadia I. El 
Mallakh, Does the Costa-Hawkins Act Prohibit Local Inclusionary Zoning Programs?, 89 
CAL. L. REV. 1847, 1862 (2001). 
 9. See INCLUSIONARY HOUSING, supra note 6, at 31-35. 
 10. See Mallakh, supra note 8, at 1872-76. 
 11. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY 
RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 327-29 (1985); WILLIAM TUCKER, 
ZONING, RENT CONTROL AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING 10-14, 71-72 (1991); Lawrence Berger, 
Inclusionary Zoning Devices as Takings: The Legacy of the Mount Laurel Cases, 70 NEB. L. 
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classic article, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, Yale Law 
Professor Robert Ellickson argues that inclusionary zoning actually 
decreases development and makes housing less affordable; thus, it 
should be called exclusionary rather than inclusionary.12 The widely 
accepted view within the law-and-economics literature has been that 
price controls through inclusionary zoning will have negative, 
unintended consequences on the housing market. 
 In recent years, however, a few noneconomists have written law 
review articles that attempt to defend inclusionary zoning on 
economic grounds.13 Andrew Dietderich’s An Egalitarian’s Market: 
The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed, Laura Padilla’s 
Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at Its 
Viability, and Barbara Kautz’s In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: 
Successfully Creating Affordable Housing all attempt to show that 
inclusionary zoning makes sense from an economic point of view.14 
Rather than dismissing inclusionary zoning as a policy that 
discourages production, these authors argue that economics tells us 
that governments should embrace inclusionary zoning as a way of 
encouraging more affordable housing. These articles have had 
considerable impact in the academic literature15 and in the policy 
                                                                                                                      
REV. 186, 187, 226-28 (1991); Philip P. Houle, Eminent Domain, Police Power, and 
Business Regulation: Economic Liberty and the Constitution, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 73 
(1989); Quintin Johnstone, Government Control of Urban Land Use: A Comparative Major 
Program Analysis, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 373, 415 (1994); Jane E. Larson, Free Markets 
Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179, 181 (1995); William W. Merrill III & Robert 
K. Lincoln, Linkage Fees and Fair Share Regulations: Law and Method, 25 URB. LAW. 223, 
280-81 (1993); Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings 
Jurisprudence—An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 588-89 (1990); Jane E. 
Schukoske, Housing Linkage: Regulating Development Impact on Housing Costs, 76 IOWA 
L. REV. 1011, 1024 (1991); Bernard H. Siegan, Conserving and Developing the Land, 27 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 279, 293-94 (1990); Matthew L. Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and 
Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 
1317 (1988); see also John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional 
Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 489-90 (1983); Carol M. Rose, Planning 
and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 
837, 898 (1983). 
 12. Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 
1170 (1981). The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed with Ellickson because it felt 
incentives offered to developers may be enough to offset the burden of inclusionary zoning. 
See Holmdel Home Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 294 (N.J. 1990).  
 13. The New Jersey court’s decision does not constitute a real challenge to Ellickson 
the way the articles, infra note 14, did. 
 14. Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: The Economics of Inclusionary 
Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23 (1996); Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on 
Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at Its Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539 (1995); 
Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, Comment, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully 
Creating Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971 (2002). 
 15. See Christophe Courchesne, What Regional Agenda?: Reconciling Massachusetts’s 
Affordable Housing Law and Environmental Protection, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 215, 237-
39 (2004); El Mallakh, supra note 8; Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory 
Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609 (2004); Tim 
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world as well—at least thirty-five California jurisdictions have 
adopted an inclusionary ordinance since the first of these articles was 
published in 1995.16 
 Despite the increasing popularity of their view, we believe that 
they fail to prove their case.17 Although authors such as Dietderich, 
Padilla, and Kautz provide the most sophisticated defense of 
inclusionary zoning to date, they make some fundamental economic 
errors and, thus, advocate misguided policy proposals. This Article 
provides a detailed discussion of the economics of inclusionary zoning 
and finds that these lawyers’ “economic” defense of inclusionary 
zoning is severely flawed. The Article is organized as follows: Part II 
gives a background on inclusionary zoning, such as where it is 
practiced and how many units it has created. Part III provides an 
overview of the economics of inclusionary zoning. Part IV responds to 
the articles that contest the standard economic analysis of 
inclusionary zoning. Part V concludes.  
II.   WHERE INCLUSIONARY ZONING IS PRACTICED AND WHAT IT HAS 
PRODUCED 
 Inclusionary zoning typically refers to a program that imposes 
price controls on a percentage of new development. The ordinances 
vary, but they typically require a certain percentage of new units be 
“affordable” to certain low-income families.18 In California, most ordi-
nances target very low, low, or moderate incomes: “very low” is usu-
ally classified as up to 50% of the county median income, “low” as 51-
80% of the median, and “moderate” as 81-120% of the median.19 De-
                                                                                                                      
Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New Doors for State Housing Regulation 
While Localism Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433 (2003); Deborah Kenn, One Nation’s Dream, 
Another’s Reality: Housing Justice in Sweden, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 63 (1996); Henry A. 
Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2001); 
Cecily T. Talbert & Nadia L. Costa, Inclusionary Housing Programs: Local Governments 
Respond to California’s Housing Crisis, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 567 (2003); David D. 
Troutt, Mount Laurel and Urban Possibility: What Social Science Research Might Tell the 
Narratives of Futility, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1471 (1997); Marc Seitles, Comment, The 
Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in America: Historical Discrimination, 
Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 89 
(1998); Christine Venezia, Comment, Looking Back: The Full-Time Baseline in Regulatory 
Takings Analysis, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 199 (1996); Lisa C. Young, Breaking the 
Color Line: Zoning and Opportunity in America’s Metropolitan Areas, 8 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 667 (2005). 
 16. See INCLUSIONARY HOUSING, supra note 6, app. at 31-35. 
 17. A limited response to particular points in these articles is contained in BENJAMIN 
POWELL & EDWARD STRINGHAM, REASON FOUND., HOUSING SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY: 
DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? (2004), http://www.reason.org/ps318.pdf. 
Responses in that study were limited to the few points most often repeated in public 
discourse. The analysis in this Article is more comprehensive and responds to their points 
in more detail and with a greater level of sophistication.  
 18. For details of the definitions of “affordable,” see id. at 11. 
 19. INCLUSIONARY HOUSING, supra note 6, at 10. 
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pending on the ordinance, builders must sell or lease 5-25% of the 
new homes at below-market rates.20 When the units are for sale in 
most California cities, the below-market rate is often hundreds of 
thousands of dollars below the market rate.21 If the units are for 
lease, the present discounted value of the revenue stream from that 
property is equivalently decreased, so the economics behind the price 
control are the same.  
 Most often, the below-market units must be of similar size and 
quality as the market-rate units and must be spread throughout the 
project in order to create integration and avoid “ghettoization.”22 
Some jurisdictions allow off-site construction or allow developers to 
pay a fee in lieu of building a below-market unit, but the intent of 
inclusionary zoning is to have the below-market units “included” 
among the market-rate units.23 Most ordinances are mandatory, 
meaning builders must participate in order to get permission to 
build,24 but a few ordinances are “voluntary” in that they offer 
incentives in exchange for a builder selling at price-controlled rates.25 
Jurisdictions may also offer compensating incentives, such as density 
bonuses, fast-track permitting, or fee waivers, but as evidenced by 
builders’ unwillingness to participate in voluntary ordinances, the 
value of these incentives is oftentimes small.26  
 Inclusionary zoning has become most prevalent over the past 
fifteen years, but it was first implemented in the 1970s in California 
and the New York and Washington, D.C., metropolitan areas.27 In 
1971, Fairfax County, Virginia, enacted inclusionary zoning by 
applying price controls to 15% of large dwellings if a developer built 
fifty or more units.28 The Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the law 
was a taking because landowners were not compensated for the new 
regulation;29 thus, Fairfax had to make it a voluntary ordinance. In 
                                                                                                                      
 20. Id. app. at 31-35. 
 21. See POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 17, at 12-13 figs.6, 7 & 8. 
 22. See Burchell & Galley, supra note 6, at 6. 
 23. CAL. AFFORDABLE HOUS. LAW PROJECT & W. CTR. ON LAW & POVERTY, 
INCLUSIONARY ZONING: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES 10 (2002), 
http://www.wclp.org/files/IZBestPracticesFINALDecember2002-1.pdf. 
 24. INCLUSIONARY HOUSING, supra note 6, at 8 (reporting that only six percent of the 
ordinances are voluntary in California). 
 25. But as Bernard Tetreault notes, “The problem is that most of them, because of 
their voluntary nature, produce very few units.” Bernard Tetreault, Arguments Against 
Inclusionary Zoning You Can Anticipate Hearing, NEW CENTURY HOUSING, Oct. 2000, at 
19; see also Kautz, supra note 14, at 982 (showing the voluntary programs are ineffective 
at producing units). We argue below that this is because of the very nature of the 
economics of inclusionary zoning that these authors fail to understand.  
 26. See Tetreault, supra note 25, at 19; INCLUSIONARY HOUSING, supra note 6, at 22. 
 27. MALLACH, supra note 6, at 196-224; see also Burchell & Galley, supra note 6, at 4-
5 (discussing other information on the history and current practice of inclusionary zoning). 
 28. Bd. of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 600, 601 (Va. 1973). 
 29. Id. at 602.  
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1973, Montgomery County, Maryland, passed its “moderately priced 
dwelling unit” ordinance, requiring 12.5-15% of units (in 
developments of more than fifty units) be affordable to families with 
50-80% of the median income.30 The ordinance in Montgomery 
County is still in effect today. Since Palo Alto first enacted 
inclusionary zoning ordinances in 1973, over one hundred California 
jurisdictions have followed suit.31 Today, affordable housing 
mandates are found in parts of Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Oregon, and Washington.32 “A 1991 survey found that nine percent of 
U.S. cities with populations over 100,000 had inclusionary zoning 
ordinances and the number appears to be growing.”33  
 With over one hundred ordinances and over thirty years of 
experience, California has the most familiarity with inclusionary 
zoning.34 California is often held up as a success story because so 
many cities have adopted these ordinances.35 Yet many advocates 
measure success based on the number of ordinances rather than the 
number of units actually built. Just as economic theory predicts that 
price controls do not encourage production, when one looks at the 
data one notices surprisingly few below-market units built. For 
example, in the San Francisco Bay Area, the Association of Bay Area 
Governments estimated the need for very low-, low-, and moderate-
priced units to be 133,195 units, or 24,217 per year during the 2001-
2006 five and a half year period.36 Yet in the thirty-plus years that 
inclusionary zoning has been implemented in the San Francisco Bay 
Area, inclusionary zoning has resulted in the production of only 6836 
affordable units, or 228 units per year.37 Controlling for the length of 
time each program has been in effect, the average jurisdiction has 
produced only 14.7 units for each year since adoption of its 
inclusionary zoning requirement.38 The number of units expected 
from inclusionary zoning clearly pales in comparison to the regional 
need. The program would have to be twenty times more effective each 
year before it could be relied on to meet the area’s five-year 
                                                                                                                      
 30. Mallach, supra note 6, at 218-19. 
 31. INCLUSIONARY HOUSING, supra note 6, app. at 31-35.  
 32. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, “Affordable” Housing Laws Make Homes 
More Expensive, ECON. EDUC. BULL., Dec. 2003, at 1 (referring to Edward G. Goetz, 
Promoting Low Income Housing Through Innovations in Land Use Regulations, 13 J. URB. 
AFF. 337, 342 tbl.2, 344 (1991)), available at http://www2.sjsu.edu/depts/economics/faculty/ 
powell/docs/EEB-12-03-AffordableHsg.pdf. 
 33. Id. at 1-2. 
 34. INCLUSIONARY HOUSING, supra note 6, at 2.  
 35. Id. at 1. 
 36. ASS’N OF BAY AREA GOV’TS, REGIONAL HOUSING NEEDS DETERMINATION FOR THE 
SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA: 2001-2006 HOUSING ELEMENT CYCLE 33 (2001). 
 37. POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 17, at 5. 
 38. Id. 
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affordable housing needs.39 The results are similar in Southern 
California. Thirteen jurisdictions in Los Angeles County and Orange 
County have inclusionary ordinances, and controlling for the length 
of time each of these ordinances have existed, these jurisdictions 
produce an average of 34 units each year.40 Yet the estimated need 
for affordable housing in this area is over 1600 units per year.41 The 
affordable housing mandates in California and elsewhere hardly put 
a dent in the regional need for affordable housing.  
III.   ECONOMICS OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING 
 The reason that inclusionary zoning has been ineffective at 
actually producing units may be explained using the economics of 
price controls. Some advocates of inclusionary zoning attempt to 
debunk the standard economic view; therefore, before addressing 
their arguments, a review of the standard economic account is in 
order. The economics of inclusionary zoning is a bit more complicated 
than the economics of rent control, but not much. One can think of 
inclusionary zoning as creating two markets for new homes—the 
price-controlled homes (the below-market homes) and the non-price-
controlled homes (the market-rate homes). The price-controlled 
portion of the market will have many of the same characteristics of 
markets with rent control, such as shortages and discouragement of 
production.42 The twist of inclusionary zoning is that if builders want 
to produce non-price-controlled units, they must also provide a 
certain number of price-controlled units. Unless these units are 
subsidized by government or some private charity, these price-
controlled units become an obligation (or an economic burden) on a 
development. The cost, which economists refer to as an opportunity 
cost, is the difference between the level of the price control and the 
level that the units could have fetched on the market. For example, if 
a builder could have sold a unit for $800,000 but must sell it for 
$200,000, then the builder is losing $600,000 that it could have 
earned. In theory, the government could offer a subsidy equal to the 
cost of the unit, but as discussed in Part IV, in practice it rarely does. 
In fact, advocates of affordable housing mandates tout their 
                                                                                                                      
 39. Id. at 6. 
 40. BENJAMIN POWELL & EDWARD STRINGHAM, REASON FOUND., DO AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING MANDATES WORK? EVIDENCE FROM LOS ANGELES COUNTY AND ORANGE COUNTY 4 
(2004), http://www.rppi.org/ps320.pdf. These Southern California numbers are biased 
upward because they include Irvine which has produced 4469 of the 6379 inclusionary 
units in this area. Id. The Irvine units were not produced via normal inclusionary zoning; 
however, many are the result of a lawsuit. Id. 
 41. PING CHANG, S. CAL. ASS’N OF GOV’TS, THE STATE OF THE REGION 2003, at 35-42 
(2003)  
 42. POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 17, at 9. 
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programs as a way to produce affordable housing without spending 
public funds.43 
 To the extent that subsidies do not cover the costs of below-market 
units, inclusionary zoning, much like development impact fees, will 
act like a tax on market-rate development.44 Although the builders 
may appear to bear the burden of paying for the below-market units, 
they might end up passing part or all of this effective tax onto buyers 
or sellers of undeveloped land. Who actually bears the burden of any 
tax is determined by actual market conditions, specifically the 
relative elasticities of supply and demand.45 Examining the 
economics of an inclusionary tax will help to determine how the 
burden is likely to be split between the builders, market-rate home 
buyers, and owners of undeveloped land. 
 Figure 1 contains a supply and demand diagram for the non-price-
controlled market to illustrate how a tax on housing impacts the 
price and quantity of new housing. The slopes of the curves vary by 
city, so the magnitudes of the changes will vary by city, but the 
diagram shows the directions of the effects of each change.46  
                                                                                                                      
 43. In fact, Dietderich claims that “[a] vast inclusionary program need not spend a 
public dime.” Dietderich, supra note 14, at 41. Noncash subsidies such as density bonuses 
are discussed in Part IV, infra.  
 44. Victoria Basolo and Nico Calavita, two supporters of inclusionary zoning, 
recognize that “[inclusionary housing] is a development fee.” VICTORIA BASOLO & NICO 
CALAVITA, POLICY CLAIMS WITH WEAK EVIDENCE: A CRITIQUE OF THE REASON FOUNDATION 
STUDY ON INCLUSIONARY HOUSING POLICY IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 11 (2004), 
http://www.nonprofithousing.org/actioncenter/campaigns/download/IH_countering_critics.pdf. 
Although in that article Basolo and Calavita argue against the theory that inclusionary 
zoning raises housing prices, Calavita’s prior writing on development impact fees clearly 
states, “Although the full amount is not necessarily passed on to consumers, high fees 
usually mean higher housing costs.” Nico Calavita & Kenneth Grimes, Inclusionary 
Housing in California: The Experience of Two Decades, 64 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 150, 153 
(1998). So although Calavita never directly admits that inclusionary zoning increases the 
price of market-rate housing, one must conclude this from his writings. This view on 
impact fees is also consistent with the California Department of Housing and Community 
Development, which wrote, “California’s high residential development fees significantly 
contribute to its high housing costs and prices.” DIV. OF HOUS. POLICY DEV., DEP’T OF 
HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., PAY TO PLAY: RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT FEES IN CALIFORNIA 
CITIES AND COUNTIES, 1999, at 99 (2001), http://www.hcd.ca.gov/hpd/pay2play/fee_rpt.pdf. 
 45. WILLIAM BOYES & MICHAEL MELVIN, ECONOMICS 492 (6th ed. 2005); see also 
POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 17, at 16-19. 
 46. In the rare market where housing in another jurisdiction without inclusionary 
zoning were a perfect substitute, the demand curve would be perfectly horizontal (or 
perfectly elastic), and the price of new homes would remain unchanged, although a tax on 
housing would still decrease quantity. One of the only ways that inclusionary zoning would 
not affect quantity is in an equally unrealistic situation where the supply curve for new 
housing were vertical (or perfectly inelastic). In this case, suppliers (raw landowners) 
would bear the full burden of the tax. This is unlikely because it would require suppliers of 
raw land to supply the same amount of land to residential development regardless of what 
price they received. A final odd case would be if buyers demanded the same quantity of 
housing regardless of price (the demand was perfectly inelastic), whereby quantity would 
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FIGURE 1 
IMPACT OF AN INCLUSIONARY ZONING TAX ON NEW MARKET-RATE 
HOUSING 
 Other variables, such as consumer income, interest rates, and 
population size, also affect the housing market, but the supply and 
demand diagram isolates the relationship between price and 
quantity, given the values of those exogenous variables.47 The 
demand curve plots the quantity demanded by consumers at different 
prices, and the supply curve plots the quantity supplied by builders 
and raw land owners at different prices. The demand curve slopes 
downward because as consumers have to pay more, they will buy 
less, and the supply curve slopes upward because as producers 
receive more, they will supply more resources for residential 
development. The equilibrium, or market-clearing price (P1 in Figure 
1), is determined by the intersection of supply and demand—at any 
price above P1, the quantity supplied exceeds the quantity demanded, 
so prices tend to fall until the two are equal; at any point below P1, 
the quantity demanded exceeds the quantity supplied, so prices tend 
to rise until the two are equal.  
 When government places a tax, like an inclusionary ordinance, on 
new development, it will affect the price and quantity of new 
development. Suppose that a development company would have been 
willing to provide ten units at $500,000 a unit, and now it has to pay 
an effective tax of $100,000 a unit. Now, rather than just receiving $5 
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million for those units, the developer has to pay $1 million in taxes.  
Thus, in order to continue to supply the same ten units of housing, 
developers would need to receive the old price, $500,000 a unit, plus 
the amount of the tax, $100,000 a unit. Such a tax is represented in 
Figure 1 by the effective supply curve shifting directly up by the 
amount of the tax, which in the above example would be $100,000. 
Although developers would like to sell ten units at $600,000 a unit, 
buyers will demand fewer than ten units at that higher price.48 The 
after-tax price of market-rate homes will be at a point where the 
“supply of housing with IZ tax” curve (the original supply curve plus 
the tax) intersects with the demand curve (points PTax and QTax in 
Figure 1).  
 Even though developers are legally responsible for providing the 
below-market units, it is unlikely that they will bear the entire 
burden or the cost of those units. The burden of the inclusionary 
zoning tax will end up being borne by some combination of builders, 
landowners, and market-rate home buyers.49 Exactly how the burden 
is split depends on the relative elasticities of supply and demand in 
each community. Except in the extremely unlikely circumstance of a 
perfectly elastic demand curve or a perfectly inelastic supply curve, a 
tax on a good always leads to higher prices for consumers. This is 
reflected by the fact that PTax is higher than P1. In Figure 1 the 
burden of the tax is split evenly between buyers and sellers, but most 
estimates of the elasticity of the supply and demand of housing show 
that suppliers are more sensitive to changes in price and are thereby 
less likely to bear the burden than consumers.50 With the exception of 
a few unrealistic cases, taxes raise the price that buyers pay, 
decrease the price that sellers receive, and lead to a decrease in 
quantity supplied.  
 When the effective tax is large enough, development will be 
discouraged altogether. The City of Watsonville, California, 
illustrates this theoretical prediction. In 1990, the City passed a law 
imposing price controls on 25% of new homes.51 The law was so 
restrictive that between 1990 and 1999, with the exception of a few 
                                                                                                                      
 48. Except in the rare case where the demand curve is perfectly inelastic (vertical) as 
described above. 
 49. Burchell & Galley, supra note 6, at 7; BASOLO & CALAVITA, supra note 44, at 11.  
 50. See Richard K. Green et al., Metropolitan-Specific Estimates of the Price Elasticity of 
Supply of Housing, and Their Sources 1 (Univ. of Wis.-Madison Ctr. for Urban Land Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 99-16, 1999), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wop/wisule/ 
99-16.html; see also Eric A. Hanushek & John Quigley, What Is the Price Elasticity of 
Housing Demand?, 62 REV. ECON. & STAT. 449, 453 (1980); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Is 
Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in House Prices 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 10,124, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10124. 
 51. Terri Morgan, Loosened Rules Lure Developers to Watsonville, SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS, Oct. 18, 2003, at 1G. 
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small, nonprofit developments, almost no new construction 
occurred.52 In 1999, the City of Watsonville realized that the law was 
driving away development. Watsonville Mayor Judy Doering-Nielsen 
said, “Our inclusionary housing ordinance was so onerous that 
developers wouldn’t come in.”53 Jan Davison, Director of the 
Redevelopment and Housing Department, commented, “[The 
inclusionary zoning law] was so stringent, and land costs were so 
high that few units were produced.”54 The consulting firm Bay Area 
Economics wrote, “The City of Watsonville adopted its inclusionary 
housing ordinance in 1991. To date, the program has directly created 
only thirteen affordable units. However, this low number is 
attributable to the lack of new development in Watsonville over the 
last ten years.”55  
 By driving out almost all development, the inclusionary ordinance 
failed to create below-market units as well. Jan Davison noted that 
the ordinance “was completely redone in 2000, and we got more units 
produced.”56 The change in 2000 lowered affordable housing 
requirements from 25% to 15% for developments with between seven 
and fifty units and to 20% for larger developments.57 Mayor Judy 
Doering-Nielsen commented, “There was an incredible pent-up 
demand.”58 After almost a decade with no new developments, 
construction began on a 114-unit development, a 351-home 
development, a 389-unit development, and a number of smaller 
developments once affordable housing requirements were lowered.59 
Overall, the number of projects approved and pending approval since 
2000 is set to increase the city’s housing stock by 12%.60 All of this 
development occurred because of a decrease in affordable housing 
requirements.  
 Because price controls discourage production, few families end up 
getting below-market units. The amount of below-market units 
produced may be greater than zero, but in most cases the supply of 
below-market units will not meet the demand. An example of such a 
shortage was in the affordable housing complex Rich Sorro 
Commons, located near San Francisco’s SBC Park.  Before it opened, 
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 55. BAY AREA ECON., CITY OF SALINAS INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAM FEASIBILITY 
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 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id.   
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the complex had 2700 applicants for only one hundred units.61 A 
family had to be fortunate enough to be living in the city, apply, and 
then win a lottery to get one of the units. The other 2600 families, as 
well as low-income families who were unable to apply, did not benefit 
from this program that gave benefits only to a select few.  
 Standard economic theory predicts that price controls lead to 
shortages and discourage production. Imposing price controls on a 
proportion of new development will not discourage production as 
much as price controls on all development, but it will discourage 
development nonetheless. By acting like a tax on new development, it 
will raise the prices of non-price-controlled housing and decrease the 
amount of new housing.  
IV.   ERRORS IN THE DEBATE OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING 
 The notion that price ceilings decrease the quantity supplied is 
one of the least controversial propositions in economics.62 
Nevertheless, recent law review articles have attempted to dispute 
the standard economic analysis.63 Many advocates of inclusionary 
zoning clearly lack a basic understanding of economic principles, and 
they completely fail to address the economic criticisms.64 Some 
lawyers such as Dietderich, Padilla, and Kautz, however, recognize 
the economic criticisms and attempt to address them head on. These 
authors’ arguments have gained popularity among many advocates of 
                                                                                                                      
 61. John King, Mission Bay’s Plans Hit Home: Conversion of Rail Yard on Track with 
Opening of Public Housing, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 13, 2002, at A1, available at 
2002 WLNR 6813969. 
 62. Kearl et al., supra note 7, at 30. 
 63. See articles cited supra note 14. 
 64. One of the most egregious examples is “economic” consultant David Paul Rosen 
who wrote that “housing price[s], be it rents or sale prices, are solely a function of market 
demand.” David Rosen, Inclusionary Housing and Its Impact on Housing and Land 
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advocates of inclusionary zoning who fail to grasp the most basic economic principles, 
many “studies” of inclusionary zoning fail to even consider the economic consequences. See 
CAL. COALITION FOR RURAL HOUS. PROJECT, CREATING AFFORDABLE COMMUNITIES: 
INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS IN CALIFORNIA (1994); see also INCLUSIONARY 
HOUSING, supra note 6; BAY AREA ECON., supra note 55.   
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inclusionary zoning, because they are the most theoretical arguments 
of why inclusionary zoning might work.65 If the economics arguments 
are wrong, price controls on a percentage of new housing may not be 
so bad after all.  
 Despite the increased level of sophistication of these arguments, 
the sophistication is only ostensible. Although the most sophisticated 
advocates of inclusionary zoning, such as Dietderich, Padilla, and 
Kautz, clearly have a better understanding of economics than most 
advocates of inclusionary zoning, their arguments do not hold up 
under scrutiny. This Part examines the merit of their arguments 
topic by topic and discusses their basic economic errors. Rather than 
reclaiming the economics of inclusionary zoning, as these authors 
assert, these authors’ convoluted arguments fail to provide a cogent 
case for price controls on a percentage of new housing.  
A.   Do Builders Absorb the Cost of Inclusionary Zoning as a Cost of 
Doing Business? 
 The issue of who ends up paying for the below-market units is 
hotly debated. The cost must be borne by some combination of 
landowners, builders, and market-rate home buyers. If people knew 
that landowners had to bear the cost of providing affordable housing, 
the policy might be considered unfair or even a taking because 
landowners have no more responsibility to pay the full cost of social 
policies than anyone else.66 If people knew that market-rate home 
buyers had to bear the cost of providing affordable housing, the policy 
also might be considered counterproductive because rather than 
creating more affordable housing, the policy would be making the 
majority of homes more expensive.67 On the other hand, many people 
consider it acceptable for builders to bear the cost of inclusionary 
zoning. Some believe that builders already make high rates of return, 
while others believe that builders have a responsibility as housing 
providers to make some homes affordable to low-income households. 
If the costs of below-market units are simply absorbed in exorbitant 
builder profits, the program is advancing a social policy that may not 
adversely affect the housing market. Padilla makes a case along 
these lines, arguing that “[e]ven if their profits are not maximized, 
                                                                                                                      
 65. See articles cited supra note 14. 
 66. Ellickson, supra note 12, at 1211-14, in fact makes this argument. However, court 
decisions have varied as to whether inclusionary zoning constitutes a taking. For example, 
in Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises, Inc., 198 S.E.2d 600, 602 (Va. 1973), a 
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 67. See Ellickson, supra note 12, at 1167-70; POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 17, at 
9, 19.  
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developers will still realize acceptable profits. Therefore, developers 
will still develop.”68 She adds, “Even if not 100% compensated, any 
remaining costs would simply be absorbed as a cost of doing 
business.”69 
 Although Padilla uses economic lingo, she completely 
misunderstands one of the most important aspects of economics: 
marginal analysis. The study of economics analyzes how people 
respond to incentives and how people weigh the additional costs and 
the additional benefits of each potential choice.70 Building is not an 
all-or-nothing proposition. If a project is marginally profitable, then 
building it makes sense; if a project is marginally unprofitable, then 
building it does not make sense. Builders must constantly decide 
whether each additional project pencils out, and if policies change 
marginal revenue or marginal costs, builders will alter their choices.  
 The effect of imposing a tax on development alone is easily 
predicted. The building industry is a competitive industry with 
relative ease of entry and exit.71 For example, many national firms 
have a choice of setting up or closing shop in any given state, and in 
the long run the number of firms can easily adjust. If profits in a 
particular area were abnormally high, profit-motivated firms would 
enter that market and, in doing so, would drive down profits to 
normal level.72 If profits in an area were negative, profit-motivated 
firms would leave the market until the profits returned to normal 
level.73  
 Suppose that the government decides to impose a cost such as 
inclusionary zoning in a specific area. The builders considering 
projects will now face different marginal revenues and different 
marginal costs, so that many projects that were profitable will 
become unprofitable at the margin. Wishful thinking 
notwithstanding, the builders will not passively respond and build 
the same quantity as before. The simplest option for builders would 
be to move to jurisdictions free from price controls. This is not to say 
that all builders will move, but some of them will; they will exit the 
market until the rate of return in the market after the tax returned 
to the level before the tax. Even if the policy were national and 
builders had no option to move, this would still decrease the quantity 
of development because investment in housing would decrease. The 
building industry, like all industries, faces financing constraints so 
that people will not invest in housing if it has lower profit margins. 
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 69. Id. at 577. 
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 71. Glaeser et al., supra note 50, at 4.  
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2005]                          INCLUSIONARY ZONING 485 
 
The idea that the cost of affordable housing will be absorbed by 
builders without decreasing the amount of construction is highly 
questionable.  
B.   Does Inclusionary Zoning Offer Developers Benefits That Offset 
Its Costs? 
 If economists are correct to point out that an affordable housing 
mandate is equivalent to a tax, then inclusionary zoning would 
decrease the production of housing and make the majority of homes 
less affordable.74 Such consequences are inconsistent with the 
expressed intent of inclusionary zoning, which is why many 
advocates of inclusionary zoning have argued that an affordable 
housing mandate is not equivalent to a tax.75 Although most 
advocates fail to recognize that providing below-market-rate housing 
entails costs,76 the more sophisticated advocates recognize that it 
entails costs but argue that these costs can be offset.77 For example, 
Kautz writes that “inclusionary requirements should be accompanied 
by real compensatory measures—in particular, substantial density 
bonuses—to minimize any effects on the overall housing supply.”78 It 
is correct that if a tax is accompanied by a large enough subsidy, the 
effective tax will be offset.  
 The first issue to determine is whether the offsetting benefits 
make up for the costs. Kautz implies that creating fully offsetting 
benefits is easy: “Even the harshest critics of inclusionary zoning, 
such as Robert Ellickson, concede that high enough density bonuses 
create affordable units at no cost to landowners, developers, or other 
homeowners.”79 Yet in many existing ordinances, the density bonuses 
are of little value and come nowhere close to making up for the costs 
of the program. In many cases, the land is already being developed to 
the maximum economically feasible density, which makes a density 
                                                                                                                      
 74. See Ellickson, supra note 12, at 1187-92; see also POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra 
note 17, at 36.  
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bonus worthless.80 Examples of worthless density bonuses occur with 
high-rises where building any higher would be too costly or with 
single-family neighborhoods where consumers demand a minimum 
lot size. Density bonuses can only be valuable in areas that practice 
exclusionary zoning where density constraints are binding. But even 
in such areas, the density bonuses will not be helpful if other 
constraints, such as water permits, are the limiting factor for 
development. In any one of these cases, a density bonus will be 
worthless.  
 The real test of whether density bonuses (or other incentives) 
make up for the costs of the program is if builders would voluntarily 
choose them. If a program was voluntary and builders chose to 
provide below-market units in exchange for a density bonus, it would 
demonstrate that the benefits more than offset the costs. Yet when 
looking at most real-world ordinances, the builders do not flock to 
participate.  
 One advocate of inclusionary zoning argued that programs must 
be mandatory; otherwise, few people would participate. Tetreault 
writes, “There are many jurisdictions that have voluntary, or 
incentive-based, inclusionary zoning ordinances. The problem is that 
most of them, because of their voluntary nature, produce very few 
units.”81 Similarly, when the California Coalition for Rural Housing 
reported its survey results, it noted that “truly voluntary programs 
are generally unsuccessful in producing affordable units.”82 If the 
programs were really such a good deal and the benefits did offset the 
costs, the programs would not need to be mandated.  
 Kautz responds to this situation by arguing that affordable 
housing mandates are profitable, but that developers fail to recognize 
this. She writes, “Even where a ‘relatively generous’ density bonus is 
given for voluntary participation, developers often fail to participate 
because they do not understand the economics of the program.”83 
Kautz may know something that everyone else does not, but she 
gives us no reason to believe why a lawyer writing in a law review 
article has a better understanding of the profitability of projects than 
actual builders who make their living doing those calculations. Even 
if Kautz were correct that developers are incapable of calculating the 
profitability of projects, as long as one or two builders stumbled into 
Kautz’s gold mine, they would start making above-normal profits, 
which would encourage others to follow. The assertion that these 
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affordable housing mandates are really profitable but builders do not 
understand the economics behind them is extremely dubious.  
 The second—and perhaps more important—response to the 
proposal for mandatory inclusionary zoning along with offsetting 
benefits is to question why price controls must accompany subsidies 
in the first place. If the government has the ability to offer subsidies 
or zoning exemptions that will increase the supply, then why must 
those policies be accompanied with a program that restricts the 
supply? Even if the program was voluntary and actually chosen, 
which would demonstrate that the subsidy offsets the cost of 
inclusionary zoning, the inclusionary zoning still has a negative 
impact on housing affordability compared to what could have been 
achieved. In such a situation the inclusionary zoning tax shifts the 
supply curve inward (just like in Figure 1), but then a subsidy comes 
along and shifts it back to its original position while housing 
production remains unchanged. But, even under these circumstances, 
the inclusionary ordinance has a negative effect. If the inclusionary 
ordinance were removed and the effective subsidy remained, then the 
supply curve would shift even further outward, resulting in a greater 
quantity of homes at even lower prices. Figure 2 illustrates this.  
FIGURE 2 
EFFECT OF SUBSIDY AND INCLUSIONARY TAX 
 Just as in Figure 1, the vertical distance between each supply 
curve is the size of the inclusionary tax. The vertical distance is also 
equal to the size of the subsidy since, by assumption, the subsidy to 
builders is exactly the same size as the inclusionary tax. In this case, 
the subsidy does reverse the negative effect of inclusionary zoning by 
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moving the curve from the top to the middle position. But a 
community could do even more to promote affordable housing. If a 
community is willing to expedite the permit process, grant valuable 
density bonuses, or offer other incentives, then adopting these 
incentives without burdening developers with inclusionary zoning 
would cause the housing supply curve to shift further to the right. 
The more the supply shifts right, the lower the prices become, 
making housing more affordable for the vast majority of buyers.   
 Dietderich goes one step further than Kautz, arguing that 
inclusionary zoning actually benefits builders and, thus, will not 
hamper supply.84 Despite builders’ demonstrated unwillingness to 
participate in voluntary programs, Dietderich attempts to devise 
reasons why inclusionary zoning will increase builders’ profits.85 His 
first argument is that builders have to consider their reputation in a 
community, not just the profits of any one project, and that these 
political concerns lead them to provide less affordable housing even 
though it would have been profitable.86 Dietderich writes, “If a 
developer decides to build low income units in a traditionally 
highbrow neighborhood, the developer is likely to lose the goodwill of 
officials who represent area residents, decreasing the developer’s 
ability to lure future buyers and win concessions from the 
jurisdiction.”87 Because lost goodwill would decrease long-term 
profits, builders refuse to participate in voluntary programs even if 
they would pencil out; however, by making the program mandatory, 
builders would benefit because they would get the density bonus 
without losing goodwill.  
 There are two problems with this argument. First, if a city’s 
residents and representatives favored affordable housing enough to 
pass an ordinance to encourage its production, why builders would 
lose goodwill for producing affordable housing is unclear. Second, at a 
more fundamental level, the erroneousness of this argument is 
demonstrated by the fact that most builders oppose inclusionary 
zoning.88 If mandatory inclusionary zoning actually benefited 
builders, why would they lack the foresight to support it? Economists 
                                                                                                                      
 84. Dietderich, supra note 14, at 75. 
 85. Id. Dietderich does note that developers lobby against inclusionary ordinances, 
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have documented many industries where industry participants have 
lobbied for government regulation in order to secure gains.89 If 
mandatory inclusionary zoning really benefited the building 
industry, one would expect to see builders lobbying for it, yet they do 
not.  
 Dietderich offers a second reason why density bonuses benefit 
builders despite their failure to make use of voluntary ordinances. He 
writes that “multi-family housing construction is marked by a 
‘learning-curve’ that may pay off exponentially as more developers 
are forced to construct multi-family units, pooling technological and 
design gains as they go.”90 Because the learning curve has spillover 
effects, Dietderich argues that individual builders lack the incentive 
to bear the cost of learning. He believes that if all builders were 
forced to build high-density multifamily dwellings, they would 
collectively make higher profits, so the issue is just pushing them to 
this Pareto superior equilibrium.91 Again, Dietderich wants the 
reader to assume that the building industry does not know what is 
profitable. Yet he gives no reason to believe that builders lack an 
understanding of the concepts of learning curves or technological 
spillovers. If mandatory inclusionary zoning really helped builders 
secure higher profits, one would expect the building industry to rally 
around Dietderich’s proposal. Because builders do not, either builders 
do not adequately understand their own industry or Dietderich’s 
argument is incorrect. We strongly suspect the latter.  
C.   Are Price Controls a Good Way to Correct for Problems Created by 
Exclusionary Zoning? 
 The one area where the advocates of inclusionary zoning are in 
agreement with the typical free market economist is with their 
criticisms of exclusionary zoning. Exclusionary zoning is the name for 
the set of policies that mandate minimum lot sizes or other levels of 
minimum quality that have the effect of excluding the poor. Without 
exclusionary zoning, multiple low-income buyers who demand 
inexpensive homes (even if they are at higher density) have the 
ability to bid land away from a few high-income buyers who desire 
                                                                                                                      
 89. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
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larger lots.92 For example, one hundred low-income buyers might be 
able to outbid ten high-income buyers for the use of a given plot of 
land; therefore, developers would find it more profitable to build 
higher-density housing to serve the low-income families. 
Exclusionary zoning, however, interferes with the market process by 
requiring larger lot sizes and low density that only the rich can 
afford.93 In agreement with economists, Dietderich writes, “To a large 
extent, it is not the presence, but the absence, of a free market in 
housing that has helped create a shortage of affordable homes for 
many Americans.”94 
 Where Dietderich and other advocates of inclusionary zoning part 
ways with economists is with their solution to the problems created 
by exclusionary zoning: price controls. Rather than advocating the 
repeal of exclusionary laws, they advocate replacing them with more 
laws, which only inflate the problems caused by exclusionary zoning. 
Dietderich equates passing inclusionary zoning with ending these 
restrictions on competition: “Persons with low to moderate incomes, 
who live at higher density, can often outbid the wealthy for suburban 
land. Although such competition is illegal under most exclusionary 
zoning rules, it makes little sense to normalize the noncompetitive 
baseline, and call any move toward competition among income 
classes a ‘subsidy.’ ”95  
 Yet inclusionary zoning is not a move towards competition. It 
simply adds another inefficient form of zoning to the existing 
exclusionary zoning. Because a portion of the homes are price-
controlled, it often pushes builders to pack them in at higher-than-
optimal densities. Rather than allowing buyers and sellers to decide, 
these planners want to choose the densities under which everyone 
lives. Their position is analogous to planners debating a government 
mandate about the maximum or minimum shoe size. If the 
government restricted the production of small shoes in the past, one 
option would be to pass laws restricting the production of large shoes 
(or mandate that small shoes be produced along with large shoes) or 
another option is simply abolish the law that restricts the production 
of small shoes.96 Just like in the shoe market, the best way to find the 
appropriate density for a development is to eliminate both 
exclusionary and inclusionary zoning. This would allow competitive 
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bidding for land between those who want low-priced, high density 
and those who want higher-priced, low density.  
 Another peculiar argument for inclusionary zoning is that it 
makes up for the past wrongs of exclusionary zoning.97 By restricting 
the supply of housing, exclusionary zoning artificially raises some 
home prices, and because those owners have received undeserved 
gains, the advocates of inclusionary zoning contend that taxing them 
with an affordable housing mandate is justified. Kautz writes:  
[H]igh housing prices are the result of local zoning policies that 
create artificial shortages of developable land for housing. The 
shortages have inflated land costs, and landowners have gained 
windfall profits due solely to cities’ zoning policies. In this 
scenario, inclusionary zoning can be viewed as a way for the public 
to share in the windfall profits it created. Exclusionary zoning is 
converted, in effect, into subsidies for inclusionary housing.98  
Despite the apparent logic of Kautz’s argument, it is faulty. First, 
Kautz fails to take account of the fact that there are different owners 
of property over time. If exclusionary zoning were able to boost 
prices, it would only benefit those owners who bought in early and 
not those who bought in late. The only residents who experienced 
windfall gains were the ones who owned property before the 
restrictive exclusionary ordinance was passed. Those who bought 
after the exclusionary zoning was in place have paid the inflated 
prices and have no windfall gains that can be taken away. Imposing a 
tax on recent buyers who have already paid the effective taxes due to 
exclusionary zoning would be a double whammy, which hardly makes 
up for past wrongs. 
 A second problem with Kautz’s argument is that inclusionary 
zoning decreases the value of some properties while increasing the 
value of others, so the tax does not have a uniform effect. When the 
costs of inclusionary zoning are passed backward to landowners, the 
policy only devalues undeveloped land; it does not devalue the 
existing stock of homes. As the supply of new housing is restricted, 
the price of existing homes will get bid up,99 so inclusionary zoning 
will increase the “windfall gains” to homeowners just like exclusion-
ary zoning. This potential was recognized by Kautz, although she 
misses the importance of the argument. Kautz writes, “[I]f the 
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inclusionary requirements are excessive and undercut profits too 
much, they may reduce housing production to a level where the 
program does indeed have an exclusionary effect.”100 What she fails to 
realize is that even small increases in affordable housing mandates 
will discourage some development. Excessive requirements discour-
age more. Economics shows that people make tradeoffs on the 
margin; therefore, restrictions on supply are not all or nothing. All 
increases in affordable housing mandates restrict the supply of some 
homes and, thus, will make existing homes less affordable. 
 Cities should only enact inclusionary zoning if the goal is to make 
the vast majority of housing less affordable. Although the intentions 
of the advocates of inclusionary zoning are unclear,101 Ellickson 
hypothesizes that some advocates know the bad consequences of 
inclusionary zoning and enact it because they want to restrict 
supply.102 Public choice economics would argue that residents might 
support inclusionary zoning because they know it restricts 
development and boosts existing housing prices.103 Ellickson says:  
[P]roponents of inclusionary zoning may not always have the 
interests of low and moderate income families at heart. I notice 
that the towns that require developers to set aside a fraction of 
new housing units for the low and moderate income families tend 
to be towns that are otherwise exclusionary.104  
He further argues that many of the towns in California enact 
inclusionary zoning for precisely this reason: 
The towns in California that have adopted inclusionary zoning 
ordinances tend to be wealthy towns. If the program were 
progressive, one would expect middle income and lower income 
towns where growth is occurring to be adopting inclusionary 
programs. But they rarely do. The affluent city of Palo Alto has 
zoned about a third of the area of the town for development at a 
maximum density of one dwelling unit per ten acres. Palo Alto also 
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has an inclusionary program, perhaps partly as a legal 
smokescreen to fool the courts.105 
Whether advocates of price controls know that their policies hurt the 
poor is unclear. Regardless of their intent, the result of inclusionary 
zoning is clear. Price controls do not reverse harmful exclusionary 
zoning practices. Instead, they exacerbate the affordability problem 
by further restricting supply and driving up the price of market 
homes. The one clear policy that reverses the effects of exclusionary 
zoning is the abolition of exclusionary ordinances. 
D.   Is Government Intervention Needed to Prevent High Housing 
Costs? 
 Many advocates of inclusionary zoning say that price controls are 
needed because a free market would not provide affordable 
housing.106 In other words, even though price controls may have 
problems, they are better than the alternative: an unregulated 
market where prices rise without limit. Once again the advocates of 
inclusionary zoning are ignoring economics and, as a result, are 
making a fundamental error. Economists of all stripes have shown 
that the cause of the affordability crisis is not the free market, but 
excessive government regulation.107  
 The first issue to recognize is that the affordability problem is not 
a national crisis;108 it is only present in those areas where the supply 
of homes has not kept up with increasing demand.109 This is well 
illustrated by the situation in the San Francisco Bay Area, one of the 
nation’s least affordable housing markets. From 1990 through 2000, 
the region added 547,590 jobs—an increase of 17%.110 The California 
Department of Finance recommends that “1.5 jobs per new housing 
unit is a healthy jobs/housing balance,”111 which means more than 
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365,000 new homes should have been built.112 Yet the region added 
only 220,154 new homes113—60% of the recommended need. Housing 
prices have soared from their already high levels as production has 
not kept pace with population and job growth. By 2002, the 
percentage of homes affordable to a family earning median income 
was only 23.9% for Oakland Metro, only 20.1% for San Jose Metro, 
and an astonishingly low 9.2% for San Francisco Metro.114  
 Why has the supply not kept pace with demand? Government 
regulation is the major impediment. Glaeser and Gyourko find that 
an affordability crisis only occurred in particular geographic areas 
that had restrictive land use regulations.115 The authors write, 
“[Z]oning and other land-use controls are . . . responsible for high 
prices where we see them.”116 Some people believe that unaffordable 
areas are so expensive because they do not have enough land, but 
economists have shown that the scarce resource is not land but 
government permission to build. Because permits to build are scarce, 
the price of entitled land is pushed up compared to the price of non-
entitled land. If intrinsically valuable land were the most expensive 
factor, people would be able to subdivide their property or build at 
higher densities, but in the current world, zoning laws prevent such 
development.117 These restrictions make housing much more 
expensive than the cost of construction. Glaeser and Gyourko’s 
econometric estimates indicate that only 10% of the gap between 
construction costs and home prices is caused by intrinsically high 
land prices; the other 90% is caused by zoning and land use 
regulations. They write: 
If policy advocates are interested in reducing housing costs, they 
would do well to start with zoning reform. Building small numbers 
of subsidized housing units is likely to have a trivial impact on 
average housing prices . . . even if well-targeted toward deserving 
poor households. However, reducing the implied zoning tax on new 
construction could well have a massive impact on housing prices.118 
Likewise, a study by University of California, Berkeley, economists 
Lawrence Katz and Kenneth Rosen on land use regulation’s effect on 
housing prices finds that until 1970, California prices had been in 
line with the national average of housing prices, but by 1980, 
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California prices more than doubled the national average.119 They 
determine that one major cause of the price increase was “a dramatic 
increase in the use of a wide variety of local land use and growth 
control mechanisms.”120 In his study of housing costs throughout the 
United States, William Tucker concludes, “[O]ne thing is obvious: 
Stringent housing regulations have certainly not helped the San 
Francisco area solve its housing problems. They may even be creating 
the problems.”121  
 Other studies with different methodologies reach similar 
conclusions. Stephen Malpezzi constructs an index of seven different 
land use regulatory variables and ranks fifty-six different 
metropolitan areas according to how strictly land use is regulated.122 
Regulatory variables included measures such as changes in length of 
approval time, time required to get land rezoned, amount of acreage 
zoned for residential development, and percentage of zoning changes 
approved.123 Malpezzi finds that a change from a lightly regulated 
environment to a heavily regulated one decreased the number of 
permits to build by 42%, increased home prices by 51%, and 
decreased home ownership rates by about 10%.124 
 However, just because prior regulations created the affordability 
problem does not mean additional zoning laws are the solution.125 
The solution is to encourage the issuance of building permits, open 
more land for development, and abolish exclusionary zoning laws. If 
government reduces and eliminates regulations that restrict housing 
development, the housing market can respond to increased demand 
just like other industries. 
E.   Is the Construction of Market-Rate Housing Harmful to Low-
Income Households? 
 Another dubious belief by advocates of inclusionary zoning is that 
the production of market-rate housing somehow hurts the poor. 
Rather than holding the views that trade is mutually beneficial and 
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that increasing the supply of housing benefits all, many advocates of 
inclusionary zoning treat markets as if they were a zero-sum game. 
According to this view, if a high-income household gains by being 
able to buy an expensive new home, it makes all low-income 
households worse off. They believe that even if the supply of new 
homes is increased, affordability will not be improved because only 
high-priced new housing will be built. 
 Economics shows that all income levels benefit even when new 
construction is high-priced. The reason is due to the interaction 
between the various housing markets, which includes the market for 
new housing and the market for existing housing. Consider what 
happens when a high-income family moves into a high-priced new 
home. When the family moves into new construction, its old home is 
freed for someone else, typically a family of lower income looking to 
upgrade. If instead a middle-income family moves into that home, its 
old home is in turn freed up for a lower-income buyer. As each 
income group moves up, its old home is freed for someone else, 
allowing many people to upgrade. Economists refer to this concept as 
filtering, because as families upgrade homes, the old homes filter 
down to those people who could not afford it before.126  
 The added benefit of this process is that it puts downward 
pressure on prices of all homes. When high-income families leave the 
market for existing homes and enter the market for new homes, they 
no longer bid up the price of existing homes. If, on the other hand, 
regulations restrict new construction, high-income people end up 
bidding up the price of the existing housing stock, making it less 
affordable. Another way to think about the benefits of increases in 
the housing stock is to think about the effects of decreases in the 
housing stock. Most people will recognize that destroying a 
percentage of existing homes will make housing less affordable 
because the existing stock of homes will get bid up. Likewise, 
preventing the construction of new homes limits the amount of 
available homes and causes the prices of all homes to be bid up.  
 This principle is illustrated in the classic study by John Lansing, 
Charles Clifton, and James Morgan, who looked at the chain of 
existing home sales in thirteen cities and found that each new home 
generated an average of 3.5 moves.127 All of those moves increase the 
supply and lower the price of existing homes, thus making them more 
affordable for low-income buyers. This study also finds that the 
benefits filter down to lower income brackets. The study reports that 
9-14% of all people who moved in the chain of upgrades were low-
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income buyers.128 The effect on moderate-income families is even 
stronger. In moves after the first new construction move, people of 
moderate income made up approximately 30% of movers.129 The 
authors conclude: “[A]ny policy which increases the total supply of 
housing will be beneficial. The working of the market for housing is 
such that the poor will benefit from any actions which increase the 
supply in the total market.”130 
 Despite the relatively uncontroversial status of this theory, 
advocates of inclusionary zoning attempt to debunk it. Although they 
recognize the potential benefits of filtering, they still offer reasons 
why it will fail to adequately help low-income buyers. At the forefront 
of this line of argumentation is Dietderich, who offers a host of 
reasons why increasing the housing supply fails to translate into 
substantial benefits for lower-income families.131 
 Dietderich’s first argument against filtering is due to the 
introduction of time. Dietderich writes, “The rate of stock 
deterioration changes with the level of maintenance expenditure, and 
the necessary level of maintenance expenditures increases as a unit 
gets older.”132 He argues that as deterioration accelerates on older, 
affordable buildings, those older units will fall out of the housing 
stock. That is, landlords will let buildings deteriorate because they 
lose their incentive to continue upkeep, and the people living in the 
homes that need the most maintenance cannot afford the upkeep 
themselves.133 Despite the seeming logic of this argument, it does 
nothing to disprove the benefits of filtering. Low-income households 
are often already the least desirable homes available. If a high-
income family moves into a new home and a moderate-income family 
moves to the high-income family’s former home, that still frees up the 
middle-income family’s former home for a family with a lower 
income. The lower-income family still upgrades from their prior 
home, which may have been a less desirable or a deteriorating home. 
The introduction of time does nothing to discredit the benefits of the 
filtering process. Imagine if no new construction took place: 
Dietderich’s problem would exist and the poor would be stuck in 
worse homes that deteriorate even faster. 
 Dietderich’s second objection is that political, cultural, geographic, 
and racial barriers separate the different stocks of homes from 
potential buyers and prevent the poor from upgrading into the 
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previously occupied unit.134 He also argues that low-income 
households fail to upgrade because of differences in the physical 
traits of units left vacant when upper-income families move.135 These 
factors include number of bedrooms, lot size, commuting location, and 
lack of public transportation in the area.136 Again, Dietderich’s 
argument misses the mark. All of his objections stem from his narrow 
view of the upgrade process. He seems to view the upgrade process as 
a situation where a low-income, urban family must move into the 
former home of a high-income, suburban family who moved into a 
newly constructed mansion. In reality the upgrade process is a chain 
of moves with multiple families making marginal improvements in 
their living arrangements.137 Even if cultural barriers prevented 
families from moving into extremely different neighborhoods, they 
would not prevent families from moving into slightly different 
neighborhoods. Families have different tastes and abilities to move 
into different situations, so as prices drop, at least someone will 
upgrade into a nicer vacant home. That in turn frees up another 
house that could appeal to many different buyers who have different 
tastes. The housing markets are better represented as a spectrum 
rather than completely stratified system. 
 Dietderich’s final argument against the upgrade process is that it 
does not work when more people are moving into an area.138 
Dietderich writes, “Whenever the number of persons interposed 
between the original buyers and the target population increases, 
filtering slows. In the 1970s and 1980s, a surge in the number of 
younger adults at middle-incomes all but eliminated filtering to the 
poor in many American cities.”139 Although an influx of population 
into an area translates into many new residents jumping into the 
chain of moves, Dietderich is incorrect to assert that new 
construction fails to keep home prices down. The relevant question is 
what would have happened to prices had the new construction not 
been built. If population is increasing and new construction is 
hampered, the new residents start bidding against existing residents 
and drive up the price of even low-quality homes. In contrast, if the 
number of newly constructed homes exactly equals the number of 
new residents, prices will remain stable.  
 Dietderich’s arguments against the upgrade process appear well 
reasoned, but they are flawed. Making high-income families worse off 
(by restricting the supply of new market-rate homes) does not 
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translate into making low-income families better off. In fact, policies 
that restrict the supply of new market-rate housing make all income 
levels worse off. One of the main barriers to the upgrade process is 
inclusionary zoning itself.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 This Article has reviewed some of the more sophisticated 
justifications for inclusionary zoning by noneconomists, such as 
Dietderich, Padilla, and Kautz, and it has found that they do not hold 
up under scrutiny. These noneconomists’ articles are replete with 
fundamental economic errors which unfortunately only muddle the 
debate. Perhaps that was their intent, as their arguments seem to be 
based more on egalitarian ideology rather than sound economic logic. 
Despite the nice-sounding name, inclusionary zoning is still a price 
control that leads to a decrease in the amount of housing. Economic 
theory and evidence demonstrate that imposing price controls and 
taxes on housing is one of the worst ways of encouraging the 
production of housing. These authors’ arguments do not overturn this 
conclusion. Offsetting benefits, such as density bonuses, does not 
eliminate the costs imposed by inclusionary zoning, which is 
evidenced by the fact that voluntary inclusionary ordinances do not 
work. Builders do not simply absorb this tax as a cost of doing 
business, nor do they continue to provide the same number of homes. 
Inclusionary zoning does not correct the problems caused by 
exclusionary zoning but instead exacerbates them. The real problems 
causing the affordability crisis are regulations that prevent increases 
in the supply of homes. Eliminating restrictive zoning regulations 
will give consumers more choice and make housing more affordable. 
For those who truly care about making housing more affordable, 
price controls are not the answer. 
